Joshua Davies' Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Denied

On May 3, 2000, while on electronic monitoring for violating his parole, 16-year-old Joshua Davies broke into his next-door-neighbor’s home by cutting a screen and opening a kitchen window. Davies then entered the bedroom of thirteen-year-old Jessica Lyons, hit her on the head with a hammer and attempted to rape her. Lindsay Haston, Jessica’s sister, rushed into the room to stop Davies and Davies hit her in the head with a hammer until she “blacked-out.” Jessica’s father, Rob Lyons, awoke and chased Davies out of the home. Jessica later died from multiple blunt force injuries to her head. 

On May 9, 2000, the State charged Joshua Davies with Criminal Confinement, a Class B felony; Rape, a Class A felony; Child Molesting, a Class A felony; Burglary Resulting in Bodily Injury, a Class A felony; Aggravated Battery, a Class B felony; Attempted Murder, a Class A felony; and Murder, a felony. Due to the charges and Davies’ age, the case was filed directly in adult court. On August 31, 2000, the State filed an amended information requesting a death sentence. 

On December 27, 2000, Davies signed a plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, he agreed to plead guilty to Burglary Resulting in Bodily Injury, a Class A felony; Aggravated Battery, a Class B felony, Murder, a felony, and Criminal Deviate Conduct, a Class A felony. The plea left the sentence open to the trial court ranging from a term of years to Life Without Parole. 

A bench trial was held on February 5-6, 2001, in front of Judge Dennis Carroll. Following the presentation of evidence, Judge Carroll found the aggravation outweighed the mitigation and sentenced Davies to an aggregate executed sentence of 108 years. Specifically, the Court sentenced Davies to 26 years for Criminal Deviate Conduct, a Class A felony, 62 years for Murder, a felony, and 20 years for Burglary Resulting in Bodily Injury, a Class A felony. Each of the sentences were ordered served consecutive to each other at the Indiana Department of Correction.

The sentence was affirmed on appeal on November 28, 2001 in Davies v. State, 758 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 

On June 25, 2014, Davies filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Public Defender’s Office entered its appearance on behalf of Davies on July 24, 2014. On August 5, 2022, Davies’ post-conviction counsel filed an Amended Post-Conviction Petition alleging: (1) the plea was not entered into a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner, (2) trial counsel was ineffective; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective; (4) Davies’ de facto life without parole sentence violates the federal and state constitutions; (5) there is newly discovered evidence based on advances in developmental psychology and neuroscience, and (6) Davies’ sentence is inappropriate due to significant changes in the legal landscape since imposition of his sentence.  On August 21, 2023, Davies filed an additional claim that Davies’ sentence violates the prohibition against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. 

An evidentiary hearing was held on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 8, 2023, where Davies and the State of Indiana presented evidence. Judge Angela Warner Sims, special judge, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 12, 2024. Therein, Judge Sims denied all of Davies claims, concluding:

1. Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Petitioner has failed to carry his burden and relief is DENIED.
2. Petitioner has failed to carry his burden to prove ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel, and his claims for relief are DENIED.
3. Petitioner’s claims pertaining to the appropriateness of his sentence are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. However, even if the court was permitted to consider them, for the reasons stated herein, the court cannot find that Petitioner’s sentence is inappropriate under current Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
4. Petitioner’s sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment, not does his continued incarceration violate Ind. Const., Art. 1, s. 18. Petitioner’s claims for relief under those two constitutional provisions are DENIED.